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1 Introduction
Data for the U.S. reveal large and persistent differences in unemployment rates across states.
The magnitude of these cross-state unemployment differences is roughly the same size as the
cyclical variation in the national unemployment rate. At the same time, there is a great deal
of labor mobility within the U.S. For example, labor mobility across states is much larger
than the total number of unemployed workers who account for the persistent unemployment
differences (see Section 2). Given the large and persistent differences in state unemployment
rates, and given the high degree of inter-state labor mobility, it seems natural to ask why
unemployment rates are so different across states.
One can explain these data features by simply assuming that non-economic factors, such
as preference shocks or shifts in local attractiveness, are the driving force of individuals’
relocation decisions. However, empirical studies that use both micro- and sub-national-level
data consistently find that inter-state migration decisions are influenced to a substantial
extent by income and employment prospects.1 In addition, the Current Population Survey
(CPS) reveals that an inter-state move is more likely to be made for work-related reasons.
More important, if workers move across regions for non-economic reasons one would expect
no cyclical pattern in labor mobility. However, this is inconsistent with the procyclicality of
labor mobility documented below.
This paper explores whether it is possible to have large, persistent unemployment differ-
ences across local markets when labor mobility is driven by income and employment. The
question is answered by developing an equilibrium multi-sector model built on the foun-
dations of the island model of Lucas and Prescott (1974).2 In their model, workers can
move between spatially separated competitive markets, referred to as islands. Moreover, the
1Greenwood (1997) surveys the earlier literature on internal migration. For recent micro studies that
relate earnings and mobility at the individual level, see, for example, Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992),
Dahl (2002), and Kennan and Walker (2011). Topel (1986) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) show that labor
mobility across states is sensitive to local labor market conditions.
2A representative sample of recent studies that build on the Lucas-Prescott model might include Alvarez
and Veracierto (2000), Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), Coen-Pirani (2010) and Alvarez and Shimer
(2011).
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marginal productivity of labor is decreasing at the local level and firms on the same island
are subject to a common productivity shock, below referred to as a local technology shock.
Although these features provide a natural framework for thinking about labor flows across
different markets, the Lucas-Prescott model alone cannot be used to address the question of
locational unemployment and geographic mobility for the following reasons. First, in their
model, a worker is unemployed only when in transition between islands, and thus, a worker’s
unemployment status is not tied to a particular island. Second, in the Lucas-Prescott model,
at a point in time, an island can experience either out-migration or in-migration, not both.
In the data, one of the key patterns of labor mobility is that a local labor market experiences
simultaneous in- and out-migration and the two flows are much larger than the corresponding
net migration in absolute terms. In other words, the basic Lucas-Prescott model is ill-suited
to address the labor market flows at the heart of this paper.
This paper makes two departures from the Lucas-Prescott model; the results below show
that these departures jointly can account for the key features of local unemployment and
mobility. The first modification is that within each island, there are trading frictions between
firms and workers as modeled in the Mortensen-Pissarides model.3 Consequently, an unem-
ployed worker not moving across islands searches for a job locally and becomes employed
with a probability of less than one.
The second departure is that a worker’s productivity is subject to a shock specific to
the worker-location match.4 As a result, workers take into account not only the labor mar-
ket conditions across the islands but also their location-specific productivity. For example,
some workers may choose to leave an island with a favorable local technology shock if their
idiosyncratic productivity on the island becomes too low to stay. Moreover, many of these
out-migrants may choose to relocate to an island with an adverse technology shock if they
are more productive there than elsewhere. Therefore, an island can experience simultaneous
3See, among others, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (2000), Hall (2005), Shimer (2005),
Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and Bils, Chang, and Kim (2011).
4This is consistent with Borjas et al. (1992), Dahl (2002), and Kennan and Walker (2011), who find that
a substantial fraction of variance in the earnings of workers is due to the worker-location match effect.
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in- and out-migration.
It is shown below that location-specific productivity is not only important for accounting
for large gross labor flows, but it also plays a crucial role in capturing key features of local
labor market dynamics. Specifically, when there is insufficient dispersion in location-specific
productivity, the model fails to capture the negative relationship between local employment
and unemployment (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992) while generating an unreasonably high
volatility for local employment.
Models that do not explicitly distinguish between mobility and unemployment cannot
explain the observed procyclicality of gross mobility. For example, in the Lucas-Prescott
model, aggregate unemployment and mobility are positively related. In contrast, the model
developed in this paper can generate a negative correlation between these two variables.
These results suggest that introducing within-market trading frictions and location-specific
productivity into an otherwise standard island model could greatly improve the model’s
predictions and thus provide a more flexible equilibrium framework within which important
welfare issues can be addressed.
There is a large literature on persistent differences between geographic areas in variables
such as income and employment. Among these studies, those that allow for labor mobility
mainly focus on net mobility.5 For example, Topel (1986) and Blanchard and Katz (1992)
study local labor market fluctuations by attributing relative shifts in a local labor force to
geographic mobility. Therefore, these papers treat net mobility, but only implicitly. Recent
work by Coen-Pirani (2010) makes an important contribution to this literature by explicitly
allowing for both net and gross mobility in an equilibrium multi-sector model to analyze labor
flows across U.S. states. The current paper is related to his work as it also allows for net
and gross mobility but extends his work by including the unemployment dimension. From
the point of view of studying regional differences in employment and unemployment, the
current paper establishes a link between the mostly empirical literature on local labor market
5Net mobility refers to the difference between in- and out-migration at the local level, while gross mobility
is defined as the number of workers moving between the markets relative to the labor force.
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dynamics (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992) and the standard equilibrium unemployment
theories (e.g., Lucas and Prescott, 1974 and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 measures cross-state un-
employment and inter-state labor mobility. Section 3 presents a simplified version of the
model and shows how unemployment and mobility are related in the presence of firm-worker
trading frictions and idiosyncratic location-specific productivity. Section 4 analyzes the full
version of the model. Section 5 examines time series properties of local employment and
unemployment in the model and compares the results with prior empirical work. Section 6
evaluates the role of location-specific productivity in local labor market dynamics. Section 7
discusses the model’s implication for the cyclicality of labor mobility. Section 8 concludes.
2 Facts
This section shows that there are large and persistent cross-state differences in unemploy-
ment. It also compares these differences with interstate labor mobility.
2.1 Cross-state differences in unemployment
The coefficient of cross-state variation. Cross-state differences in unemployment are mea-
sured using the coefficient of variation of unemployment across states. Let ri,t denote the
unemployment rate of state i and rt the aggregate unemployment rate of the U.S. at time










denotes the relative unemployment rate of state i: rRi,t = ri,t/rt.
6 The coefficient of variation
is measured using seasonally adjusted monthly state unemployment and labor force series
constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).7 Between Jan. 1976 and May 2011,
the coefficient of variation of cross-state unemployment ranges from 0.175 to 0.346 with an
average of 0.237.
A comparison with cyclical and cross-country unemployment. To give an idea of how large
this variation is, cross-state unemployment differences are compared with cyclical aggregate
6For brevity, the District of Columbia of the U.S. is referred to as a state in this paper.
7The BLS’s methodology of constructing these series is described at http://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm.
4
unemployment, which is considered to be one of the most volatile aggregate variables. The
data show that the coefficient of variation of monthly aggregate unemployment over the same
period is 0.245. Thus, the cross-sectional unemployment variation is as large as the variation
of aggregate unemployment over time. Another dimension where unemployment exhibits
considerable variation is across countries. The OECD data reveal that between 2003 and
2010, the coefficient of variation of the unemployment rates of European countries measured
by CV average 0.404. When two outliers, Spain, where average unemployment is more than
12 percent, and Switzerland, where it is less than 4 percent, are excluded, the coefficient
of variation becomes 0.355. These numbers suggest that unemployment differences across
the U.S. states are approximately 60-70 percent of the unemployment differences across Eu-
ropean countries, suggesting that there are large cross-sectional differences even within a
country.
Differences at the individual level. It is possible that differences in unemployment between
local labor markets are small for most of the labor force while a few states have dispropor-
tionately high or low unemployment. If the cross-state unemployment differences measured
by CV are generated largely by smaller states, then those differences would not be of much
interest, at least from a macroeconomic perspective. To see if this is the case, the following








, where Li,t denotes state i’s




the sample period, CVw averages 0.204, indicating that spatial differences in unemployment
are also large at the individual level.
Controlling for state fixed effects. Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that state relative un-
employment rates exhibit no trend. They also find a very low correlation for relative state
unemployment rates between time periods 10 to 20 years apart. These suggest that state
fixed effects are not large and that the permanent differences in local attractiveness are not
8Since unemployment of smaller states may have measurement errors due to their small sample size, CVw
also corrects for a potential upward bias in CV.
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the main reason for regional unemployment differences. Nevertheless, to quantify differences









, where rRi is the mean relative unemployment rate of state
i over the sample period. The coefficient of variation CVwf averages 0.148. This means
that, with an aggregate unemployment rate of 6 percent, the one-standard-deviation range
of cross-sectional unemployment is 5-7 percent. So, cross-state differences in unemployment
remain large even after removing state fixed effects. The online data appendix (Appendix A)
explores different ways to measure cross-state unemployment.9 The conclusion remains quite
robust. Unemployment rate differences measured by CV, CVw and CVwf are summarized in
Table 1.
2.2 Mobility
Using state-level data, Blanchard and Katz (1992) show that migration reduces local unem-
ployment differences. Moreover, the CPS reveals that, within age and educational groups,
recent in-migrants are more than twice as likely to be unemployed as incumbent workers
(see the data appendix). Given this close relationship between mobility and unemployment
at both local and individual levels, cross-state unemployment is compared with inter-state
labor mobility.
Gross mobility. Table 2 shows that over the period 1981 to 2000, 3 percent of the labor
force changed their state of residence each year. To compare this observed annual mobility
with cross-state unemployment, I calculate the minimum annual mobility needed to arbi-
trage cross-state differences in unemployment. Clearly, this minimum mobility is also the
number of workers who “create” the observed cross-state unemployment differences. Thus,
the minimum number of movers needed to eliminate cross-state unemployment differences
can be calculated as
∑
i
(ri − r)LiI(ri > r), where I is the indicator function, which takes
the value 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise. Between 1976 and 2010, this minimum
9Supplementary materials containing the appendices can be found at the end of the paper.
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number averages 0.5 percent of the labor force. This is small compared to the observed
mobility rate of 3 percent. Although this calculation does not take into account how the
local markets respond to mobility and how individuals make their moving decisions, it does
suggest that labor mobility is much larger than cross-sectional unemployment.
Net mobility. Another important feature of inter-state labor mobility is that in- and out-
migration flows at a local level are larger than the corresponding net migration. To see
this, let mini,t denote the number of workers who in-migrate to state i during year t relative
to the state’s labor force of year t. Similarly, let mouti,t denote the number of workers who
out-migrate from state i during year t relative to the state’s labor force of year t. Table 2
shows that these in- and out-migration rates have little variation across states, implying
that the net migration rate, mini,t−mouti,t , is much smaller than both mini,t and mouti,t in absolute
terms. This small net mobility relative to gross mobility will be one of the key data features
considered in the quantitative analysis below and thus needs to be quantified. For this pur-
pose, let σm,i denote the standard deviation of the net migration rate of state i over time.
Then, overall net mobility, denoted by σm, can be defined as a weighted average of these
standard deviations using the labor share of each state as the weight. Given the interstate
labor flows over the period 1981-2009, σm = 0.011. It can be seen that σm also measures
the shifts in local labor forces due to labor mobility. Therefore, the fact that these shifts are
much smaller than the gross mobility of 3 percent also indicates small net mobility.10
3 The homogeneous islands model
The goal of this paper is to develop an equilibrium multi-sector model that is capable of
reproducing the empirical facts presented above. At the same time, the paper also aims
to account for key features of local labor market dynamics, including those documented by
Blanchard and Katz (1992). In the interest of clarity, the model is presented in two steps.
First, the current section considers an economy of a continuum of islands with the same
10See Coen-Pirani (2010) for other features of inter-state worker flows.
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labor market conditions and thus the same unemployment. In the economy, large labor
mobility across islands is driven by idiosyncratic location-specific productivity. There is no
net mobility in this economy; that is, for each island, in-migration equals out-migration.
Workers searching for a job locally become employed with a probability of less than one.
This economy is referred to as the homogeneous islands model. This simple model is used
to show how trading frictions and location-specific productivity affect unemployment and
mobility. Second, the next section introduces a stochastic local technology shock. The shock
shifts local labor market conditions and thus generates a gap between in- and out-migration
at the local level. The economy with the stochastic local technology shock will be referred
to as the heterogeneous islands model.
3.1 Environment
The economy is composed of a continuum of islands inhabited by a measure one of workers
and a continuum of firms. Time is discrete. Workers and firms are infinitely lived. Workers
are either employed or unemployed. Being employed means being matched with a firm. Each
period an unemployed worker decides whether to stay on her current island to search for a job
or to move to another island to look for a better opportunity. When moving between any two
islands, an unemployed worker incurs a fixed moving cost C. Workers cannot move across
islands while employed. Therefore, every mover is unemployed, while not all unemployed
workers are movers.11 Workers on the same island can differ by their productivity specific
to the island and this location-specific productivity evolves stochastically over time. Let
x denote a worker’s productivity specific to her current location. Per-period output of a
firm-worker match is given by the worker’s location-specific productivity x.
Within-market frictions. All firm-worker matches are dissolved at an exogenous rate λ.
Firms look for workers by creating vacancies. The flow cost of a vacancy at productivity
11The data appendix shows that the unemployment gap between movers and stayers in the model is
comparable to that in the data.
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level x is kx.
12 Vacancies and unemployed workers meet at random according to a matching
technology. Specifically, the number of new matches formed at productivity level x on a
particular island is Λ(v(x), u˜(x)), where v(x) and u˜(x) are the number of vacancies and
unemployed workers searching at the productivity level x on the island. The matching
function Λ is non-negative, strictly increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree one.
The probability that each of these u˜(x) workers finds a job is f(q(x)) = Λ(1, 1
q(x)
), where
q(x) = u˜(x)/v(x) is the queue length. Each of the v(x) vacancies is filled with the probability
α(q(x)) = f(q(x))q(x).
The flow utility of a worker searching for a job locally (stayer) is b, while the flow utility
of a mover is b − C. The flow utility of an employed worker is her wage w. The wages
are determined through Nash bargaining between the worker and the firm over the match
surplus, which refers to the value of the match relative to the sum of the value of being
unemployed to the worker and the value of being separated to the firm. Workers and firms
discount their future by the same factor β.
Idiosyncratic shocks. By construction, location-specific productivity does not change during
the life of a job (or a worker-firm match). However, if a worker who is employed at time t−1
at productivity level x becomes unemployed at time t, she draws her new productivity, xt,
from the distribution Qu(x
′|x). The latter is weakly decreasing in x, implying persistence in
location-specific productivity. If the new shock xt is high enough, the unemployed worker
will stay on her current island and search for a job at the new productivity level. However,
if it is too low, the worker will move to another island to look for a better opportunity. In
that case, the productivity shock for the new island is drawn from the distribution Qm(x).
Timing of the events. Each time period consists of four stages. At the beginning of each
period, some of the old matches are dissolved. At the same time, the pool of unemployed
workers on a given island is augmented by new workers arriving from the rest of the economy.
12In the calibrated version of the model, kx increases with x. This might reflect the possibility that hiring
at a higher productivity level is more costly as firms might have to hire even more productive workers to
interview a potential applicant or to train a newly hired worker.
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In the second stage, workers observe their productivity shock, x. In the third stage, some of
the unemployed individuals could decide to leave their current island to search for a better
opportunity elsewhere. These workers arrive at another island at the beginning of the next
period. The probability of arriving at a specific island is the same across islands. Also in
the third stage, production and vacancy creation occur, while the unemployed workers who
decided to stay in the local market search for a job. In the last stage, new matches are
realized.
3.2 Value functions and wages
Workers. Let S(x) denote the expected lifetime utility value of searching for a job on the
current island at productivity level x. Let M denote the value to the worker of leaving the
current island. Then, the value of being unemployed is H(x) = max {S(x),M}. If a worker
of productivity x is employed at wage w, the lifetime utility is given by
W (x) = w + β(1− λ)W (x) + βλ
∫
H(x′)Qu(dx′|x). (1)
Given the probability that an unemployed worker of productivity x finds a job is f(q(x)),
the value of searching for a job on the current island is given by
S(x) = b+ βf(q(x))W (x) + β(1− f(q(x)))H(x). (2)
The value of leaving the current island is given by
M = b− C + β
∫
H(x)dQm(x). (3)
Firms. Let J(x) denote the value to a firm of being matched with a worker of productivity
x. Since x remains constant during the life of a firm-worker match,
J(x) = x− w + β(1− λ)J(x). (4)
The value to a firm of creating a vacancy at productivity level x is given by
V (x) = −kx + βα(q(x))J(x). (5)
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(W (x;w)−H(x))γ (J(x;w)− V (x))1−γ} , (6)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the worker’s bargaining power.
3.3 Solution
Let H0 denote the value of a worker’s continuation utility of arriving at a new island, i.e.,
H0 =
∫
H(x)dQm(x). Analogous to Lucas and Prescott (1974), the local labor market
equilibrium is characterized by treating H0 as a parameter. Once the value of searching for a
job in the local labor market is obtained, H0 is determined using workers’ mobility decisions.
The shock process. To increase the tractability of the model, the following specification of
the transition function Qu(x




′) if x′ < x,
ψ + (1− ψ)G(x′) otherwise
(7)
where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 and G denotes the uniform distribution function on the interval [1−ω, 1 +
ω]. This means that for newly unemployed workers, location-specific productivity remains
unchanged with probability ψ, and when it changes, the new productivity shock is drawn
from G. Further, it is assumed that newly arrived workers also draw their productivity shock
from G, i.e., Qm(x) = G(x) for all x. So, the distribution functions Qm(x) and Qu(x
′|x) are
captured by only two parameters: ψ and ω.
Stayers and firms. Free entry implies that V (x) = 0 for all x. Combining this condition












β(1− γ)α(q(x)) = x+ βλ(1− ψ)H0, (8)
where λ˜ = 1 − β(1 − λ). Since λ˜ − βλψ > 0, the left-hand side of equation (8) is strictly
decreasing in q(x). Therefore, this equation pins down the queue length q(x). Then, using
13The derivation of the key equations in this section is contained in Appendix B.
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equation (5) and the free-entry condition, the productivity-specific unique wage is given by
w(x) = x− λ˜kx
βα(q(x))
. (9)
To summarize, given H0, the local labor market equilibrium is characterized by equations (8)
and (9).
It is assumed that the queue length is the same across productivity levels. Let this
common queue length be q1. Then, for each productivity level, the probability of finding
a job is f(q1). This normalization, along with equation (8), implies that kx is linear in x.
Then, equation (9) implies that the wage is linear in productivity. Consequently, S(x) is
also linear in x:
S(x) = ζ0 + ζ1H0 + ζ2x, (10)
where ζ2 =
(
λ˜ − βλψ + λ˜(1−β)
βγf(q1)
)−1
, ζ1 = βλ(1 − ψ)ζ2, and ζ0 = b1−β (1 − ζ2(λ˜ − βλψ)). It
can be shown that ζ0 > 0, 0 < ζ1 < β and ζ2 > 0. So, higher location-specific productivity
means higher lifetime utility.
Movers. Clearly, if the moving cost C is too high or the value of moving M is too low, there
will be no labor mobility across the islands. Therefore, in order to have labor mobility, one
must have that S(1− ω) < M . Under such a circumstance, there exists a productivity level
xc such that S(xc) = M and 1− ω < xc ≤ 1 + ω (see Figure 1). Unemployed workers with
productivity below xc leave their current island, while those with productivity equal to or
above xc search for a job on their current island. Therefore, the probability that a newly
unemployed worker moves to another island is (1− ψ)G(xc). Using equations (3) and (10),
it can be shown that













(C − b), (11)
where ν = 1−ζ1
β−ζ1 > 1. Finally, using xc given by equation (11), the value of a worker’s
continuation utility of arriving at a new island is
H0 =
ζ0 − b+ C + ζ2xc
β − ζ1 . (12)
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3.4 Interdependence of mobility and unemployment





















Using these two equations, one can see some of the key differences between the current model
and other commonly used sectoral allocation models. For example, in the Lucas-Prescott
model, a worker is unemployed only when moving between two islands and therefore local
unemployment is not defined. On the contrary, equation (14) shows that the current model
allows for an explicit distinction between unemployment and mobility. Moreover, unlike in
the Lucas-Prescott model, there can be unemployment even in the absence of labor mobility.
In this regard, a particularly interesting case arises when the volatility of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock, ω, goes to zero. Specifically, using equations (11), (13) and (14), it
can be shown that lim
ω→0





. The last equation is nothing but the
unemployment rate of a standard search and matching model (Pissarides, 2000). So, in the
limit as ω goes to zero, the model converges to the textbook search and matching model.
Thus, the model developed in this paper can be thought of as a set of search and matching
economies among which workers can move for better employment opportunities. It is useful
to keep this analogy in mind when discussing the impact of the local technology shock.
3.5 An adverse local technology shock
In the above economy, there are no unemployment differences across islands. However,
one can use the above results to see the mechanism through which local unemployment can
differ from aggregate unemployment in the presence of high labor mobility. For this purpose,
consider an unanticipated, permanent shock to one of the islands, say, island 1.14 Suppose
14For expositional purposes, I focus on permanent shocks for the remainder of the section. One can reach
the qualitatively same conclusions by considering a productivity shock of shorter duration as long as the
shock affects the expected match surplus of a new firm-worker pair.
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that, due to the shock, per-period output of a firm-worker match on the island is now xz (as
opposed to x in the absence of the shock), where z is a positive number close to 1. For the
remainder of the paper, z is referred to as a local technology shock.
Proposition 1. An adverse local technology shock (z < 1) raises the queue length q(x) and
therefore lowers the job-finding rate f(q(x)) in the local market for all x.
Proof. Replacing x in the right-hand side of equation (8) by xz and using the fact that the
left-hand side of the equation is strictly decreasing in q(x), it can be seen that q(x) goes up
as z declines. Consequently, the probability of finding a job on the island, f(q(x)), declines
for all x.
Impact on in- and out-migration. Since the adverse shock reduces the match surplus at each
productivity level, the productivity-specific wages of the island also decline. As both the
productivity-specific wage and the job-finding rate go down, the value of searching for a job
on this island, S(x), declines for all x. However, since there is a continuum of islands, the
value of leaving the island, M, remains the same (see Figure 2). As a result, the number of
people leaving the island will sharply increase upon realization of the shock. New workers
will still come to the island from the rest of the economy, but at a lower rate. These fewer new
settlers will have, on average, higher location-specific productivity (i.e., higher x) for island 1
than those who were arriving before the permanent shock.15 So, for island 1, out-migration
will be higher than in-migration until the island’s labor force reaches a lower permanent
level.
Higher or lower unemployment? In one-sector search and matching models an adverse shock
to overall productivity raises the aggregate unemployment rate. However, this well-known
result may not always hold at the local level, meaning that an adverse local technology
15Productivity differences of workers on the same island are captured by their location-specific shocks.
It is straightforward to introduce individual-specific permanent effects and schooling levels into the model.
One can also make individuals’ productivity grow over time, for instance, by introducing a probabilistic-
aging process. Under such extensions, the relationship between productivity and mobility is not necessarily
monotonic (Lkhagvasuren, 2007, 2012).
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shock (z) may reduce the local unemployment rate. To see this, suppose that the volatility
of the location-specific productivity is very small. Then, an adverse local technology shock
can make the value to a worker of searching for a job on the island less than the value of
moving to other islands, i.e., S(x) < M for all x (see Figure 2). Put differently, when there is
insufficient heterogeneity in location-specific productivity, an adverse local technology shock
may cause all unemployed workers of island 1 to move to other islands.
At the same time, using Proposition 1, the island’s employment will go down in response
to the adverse shock. This means that when there is insufficient dispersion in location-specific
productivity, employment and unemployment will be positively correlated at the local level,
a prediction that stands in sharp contrast to the U.S. data. For example, using state-level
data, Blanchard and Katz (1992) show that a drop in local employment is reflected in an
immediate increase in local unemployment.
However, on the contrary, if the volatility of productivity is large, there can be unem-
ployed workers whose productivity is high enough to choose to stay on the island and thus
the island’s unemployment can increase. So, large idiosyncratic productivity shocks are not
only important for generating simultaneous in- and out-migration, but they are also crucial
in accounting for local fluctuations such as the negative correlation of local employment and
unemployment.
3.6 Responsiveness of local unemployment
While a substantial volatility of location-specific productivity is necessary to account for
the direction of shifts in local unemployment, too large a volatility of location-specific pro-
ductivity reduces the impact of the local shock on the magnitude of the shifts. The reason
is as follows. As the volatility of location-specific productivity increases, workers become
choosier when searching across local markets and search for jobs with a significant match
quality. Thus, an overly high volatility of the idiosyncratic productivity shock widens the
gap between overall productivity and the flow utility of unemployed workers. This makes
15
local unemployment less responsive to the local technology shock.16
Then, the question is whether there exists a productivity dispersion (ω) that can account
for both the direction and magnitude of shifts in local unemployment while allowing for high
labor mobility. The question is addressed in the next section by considering a stochastic
local technology shock and calibrating the model using U.S. data. Before going to this
numerical analysis, I examine how an aggregate shock affects unemployment and mobility
in the homogeneous islands model. The results are useful for understanding the relationship
between aggregate unemployment and mobility.
3.7 Aggregate unemployment and mobility
Consider a permanent aggregate shock that raises per-period output of all matches in the
economy by, say, 1 percent. Since this aggregate shock raises the overall return to migration,
the probability that a newly unemployed worker leaves his or her island increases. At the
same time, the probability of finding a job will also respond to the aggregate shock.
Proposition 2. An increase in overall productivity raises the job-finding rate for all stayers.
Proof. An increase in overall productivity raises the value of searching for a job on each island
(see Proposition 1). This raises the flow utility of separation, H0. Then, using equation (8),
the job-finding probability f(qx) increases for all x.
Due to the increases in both the job-finding rate and the probability that a newly unem-
ployed worker leaves her current island, workers move more frequently between the islands.
So, the aggregate shock raises labor mobility. Since moving across markets takes time and
movers are unemployed, higher mobility induced by the aggregate shock puts upward pressure
on unemployment. On the other hand, a higher job-finding rate for stayers puts downward
pressure on unemployment. Therefore, the net impact of the aggregate shock on aggregate
unemployment is analytically ambiguous. Nevertheless, this simple thought experiment in-
dicates that if the job-finding rate does not respond to the aggregate shock, mobility and
16Bils et al. (2011) also find a negative impact of greater match quality shocks on the volatility of aggregate
unemployment.
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unemployment in the model will be positively correlated as in Lucas and Prescott (1974). In
Section 7, it will be shown numerically that the effect of the job-finding rate can dominate the
mobility effect and thus generate a negative correlation between aggregate unemployment
and gross mobility, a prediction consistent with the U.S. data.
4 The heterogeneous islands model
Here, each island is subject to a stochastic local technology shock. Because of this technology
shock, employment on each island will fluctuate over time. Then, assuming that production
takes place under constant returns and requires labor and land, flow output of a firm-worker
match will depend negatively on local employment.17 This negative dependence is captured
by the following per-period output of a firm-worker match:
y(x, z, E˜) = xzE˜−φ, (15)
where 0 < φ < 1, z is the island’s technology shock, x is the location-specific productivity
of the worker, and E˜ is the island’s employment relative to economy-wide employment.
The local technology shocks are uncorrelated across islands and have a common stationary
transition function Pr(zt+1 < z
′|zt = z) = Π(z′|z) given by the following autoregressive
process: zt+1 = 1 − ρ + ρzt + t, where 0 < ρ < 1 and t is a zero-mean normal random
variable with variance σ2 . The local technology shock is realized at the beginning of each
period.
The local market condition. Let h denote an individual’s employment status: h = 0 if
employed and h = 1 if unemployed. Let µ(h, x) denote the measure of individuals residing
on an island at the moment following the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. Since the
extent to which an individual is attached to her current market depends on her employment
status and location-specific productivity, the responsiveness of the local labor force to the
local technology shock z depends on the measure µ. Therefore, a local labor market is
17When the supply of the non-labor input is fixed in the short run, flow output’s negative dependence on
employment arises under a quite general setting. See, for example, Rogerson, Visschers, and Wright (2009)
and Coen-Pirani (2010) for models with and without trading frictions, respectively.
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characterized by its current technology shock z and the measure µ. Moreover, the next
period’s measure µ′ is determined by the current technology shock z and the current measure
µ. Let Γ denote this evolution, i.e., µ′ = Γ(z, µ). Let Φ denote the stationary distribution





for all z and all (Z×M) ⊂ (Z ×M), where Z andM are sets of all possible realizations of
z and µ, respectively.
4.1 Value functions and wages
Unlike in the homogeneous islands model, the expected lifetime utility values will now depend
on the local labor market condition s = (z, µ). Thus, workers and firms have to solve their
problem subject to the law of motion Γ and the stationary economy-wide distribution Φ.
Workers. To a worker of productivity x, the value of being employed at wage w is given by
W (x, s) = w + β(1− λ)E[W (x, s′)|s] + βλE[H(x′, s′)|x, s], (17)
where H(x, s) = max {S(x, s),M} and E denotes the expectation. The lifetime utility value
of searching for a job on the current island is given by
S(x, s) = b+ βf(q(x, s))E[W (x, s′)|s] + β(1− f(q(x, s)))E[H(x, s′)|s]. (18)
As in the homogeneous islands model, the probability that a worker arrives at a specific
island from her initial move is the same across islands. However, as workers are allowed to
make repeat moves, the probability that a mover settles down on a better island is higher.18
Then, the expected lifetime utility value of leaving the current island is
M = b− C + βEH(x, s), (19)
18An alternative is to assume directed search across markets under which workers do not go through
repeat mobility. However, Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) argue that assuming directed versus random
search across markets is less important when the model period is short like the one considered in this
paper. Appendix C provides further reasons why it is even less consequential when there is location-specific
productivity. Random search across markets is maintained solely for computational reasons, since it greatly
reduces the number of dynamic programming states.
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where the expectation is taken over both Qm and Φ.
Firms. The value of a match to a firm is
J(x, s) = y(x, z, E)− w + β(1− λ)E[J(x, s′)|s). (20)
Then, the value of a vacancy is given by
V (x, s) = −kx + βα(q(x, s))E[J(x, s′)|s]. (21)
Wages. As before, the wage payment reflects a Nash bargaining solution:
w(x, s) = arg max
w
{
(W (x, s;w)− S(x, s))γ (J(x, s;w)− V (x, s))1−γ} . (22)
4.2 Measures





µ(1, x)dx, respectively. As in Section 2, L and r denote the local labor force and
unemployment rate, respectively: L = E + U and r = U/L. Let Ω denote the decision rule
governing whether an unemployed worker stays on her current island: Ω(x, s) takes on the
value 1 if S(x, s) ≥ M and 0 otherwise. Then, the number of workers leaving an island is
given by m(s) =
∫
(1 − Ω(x, s))µ(1, x)dx. Without loss of generality, normalize the average
number of workers per island to one. Then, overall mobility and aggregate unemployment
are m =
∫
m(s)dΦ(s) and r =
∫
µ(1, x)dxdΦ(s), respectively. Moreover, local employment

































for allX0 ⊂ X where X denotes sets of all possible realizations of x, pi0(x, s) = f(q(x, s))Ω(x, s)
and pi1(x, s) = (1− f(q(x, s)))Ω(x, s). Appendix C contains the definition of the equilibrium
as well as the numerical solution method.
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4.3 Calibration
The length of the time period is a quarter of a month, which will be referred to as a week.
The discount factor β is set to 1/1.051/48, a value consistent with an annual interest rate of
5 percent. The elasticity of flow output of a firm-worker match with respect to land is set
to that in Coen-Pirani (2010): φ = 0.015. This value is consistent with an income share of
land in manufacturing estimated by Ciccone (2007). The separation rate is set to the one
measured by Shimer (2005); normalizing it to a weekly frequency, λ = 0.0083.
The parameters governing search frictions are adopted from Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008). Specifically, the bargaining power of a worker, γ, is set to 0.052 and the number
of new matches formed at productivity level x on an island is given by Λ(v(x), u˜(x)) =
((v(x))−η + (u˜(x))−η)−
1
η , where η = 0.407. According to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008),
for a marginal worker, the flow utility of unemployment relative to productivity is 0.955. This
value is used for the flow utility of a stayer relative to the lower bound of location-specific
productivity, i.e., b = 0.955(1− ω).
Given the rest of the parameters, the moving cost C is set to target gross mobility of 2.8
percent. As in the homogeneous islands model, the vacancy creation cost kx is assumed to
be linear in x. The intercept of this linear relationship is chosen to achieve the target unem-
ployment rate of 5.7 percent (Shimer, 2005), while its slope is determined by equation (8).
The local technology shock is calibrated by targeting the persistence and volatility of
local labor productivity. As in Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Bauer and Lee (2005), local
labor productivity is measured using the logarithm of the ratio of private non-farm gross
state product to employment minus the same variable for the entire United States. Between
1974 and 2004, for an average state, the standard deviation of the cyclical shifts of this
productivity is σy=0.027, while its persistence at an annual frequency is ρy = 0.655. These
values are targeted to choose ρ and σ. In the model, annual labor productivity of an
island is constructed as the weighted average of its weekly labor productivity using weekly
employment as the weight.
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The persistence of the location-specific shock x is chosen by combining earlier analytical
results and prior studies on labor income dynamics. As discussed earlier, the productivity of
an employed worker remains constant during a particular job and changes with probability
1−ψ upon job separation. Thus, each week, the productivity of an employed worker remains
unchanged with probability 1 − λ(1 − ψ). Since the wage is linear in productivity, the
persistence of the wage is equal to that of productivity. On the empirical side, estimates of
the persistence of individual labor income range from 0.75 to 0.95 at an annual frequency,
depending on how measurement error and unobserved effects are treated (Chang and Kim,
2007; Guvenen, 2009). Taking into account the logarithmic scale inherent in the persistence
parameter, the midpoint of this range is 0.866.19 This value is used for the annual persistence,
i.e., (1− λ(1− ψ))48 = 0.866. Given λ = 0.0083, this dictates that ψ = 0.697.
The only remaining parameter is ω, which measures the volatility of location-specific
productivity. As discussed in Section 3, the parameter governs the responsiveness of labor
mobility to the local technology shock. Thus, the parameter is chosen by targeting net
mobility σm = 0.011, an estimate obtained in Section 2. (Section 6 shows that net mobility
σm and the productivity dispersion ω are indeed inversely related.) For the remainder of the
paper, the current calibration is referred to as the benchmark model.
4.4 Main predictions
Table 3 displays the parameters of the benchmark model. The targeted moments and key
predictions of the model are reported in Table 4. The table indicates that the model performs
well along the targeted moments. Most important, it shows that the model is able to account
for large observed cross-sectional differences in unemployment while allowing for high labor
mobility. Although not directly targeted, the persistence of the local unemployment rate in
the model economy is comparable with that measured from state-level data. I will talk more
19This value is given by 0.95g where g is such that 0.95g = 0.751/g. Note that when calculating the
persistence of individual income shocks in the model, the effect of the local technology shock z is ignored. This
is for the purpose of keeping the calibration consistent with empirical estimates of labor income dynamics,
which control for local labor market effects (Chang and Kim, 2007; Guvenen, 2009).
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about the local labor market evolution shortly.
The average wage in the economy is 0.965. Therefore, C = 4.911 means that the moving
cost is one-tenth of annual labor income. The vacancy creation cost kx increases linearly in
x and ranges between k1−ω = 0.794 and k1+ω = 1.222. These costs, along with the matching
function parameter η = 0.407, imply overall labor market tightness of 0.625, which is slightly
higher than 0.539, the value obtained by Hall (2005), but very close to 0.634, an estimate
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). The average monthly job-finding rate in the model is
0.463, which lies in the range of 0.388 to 0.773, the values estimated by Hall (2005) using
the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
5 Additional evidence: time series patterns
Although Table 4 shows that the model performs well along the dimensions of volatility and
persistence of the local unemployment rate, it does not provide a detailed description of local
labor market dynamics. Blanchard and Katz (1992) were among the first to analyze local
labor market evolutions by considering a set of autoregressive processes for state-level data.
This section applies the key time series processes proposed by Blanchard and Katz (1992)
to the simulated data. It should be made clear that the purpose of this exercise is not to
suggest that the assumptions in the current paper are consistent with those in Blanchard and
Katz (1992). Instead, the exercise explores whether the time series patterns of state-level
data established by these authors can also be obtained from the model economy.
5.1 Univariate processes
First, using simulated data, the following two univariate processes are considered:
∆et = c0 +
4∑
j=1
cj∆et−j + εe,t (25)
and
rt = c0 + c1rt−1 + c2rt−2 + εr,t, (26)
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where ∆et is the log annual employment growth at year t (i.e., ∆et = log(Et/Et−1)), rt is the
local unemployment rate at year t and εe,t and εr,t are the innovation terms. Table 5 displays
the regression coefficients of these two equations along with the associated impulse responses.
It shows that, in response to an innovation of 1.0, employment increases to 1.5 after three
years and then in the long run reaches a plateau at 1.3. Blanchard and Katz (1992) report
that in response to the same innovation, employment in an average state increases to about
1.5 after three years and then in the long run reaches a plateau at about 1.3. (See Table 1
of Blanchard and Katz, 1992.) They also find that depending on the individual states, the
long-run response lies between 1.0 and 2.0. So, the model is able to replicate both the hump
shape and the magnitude of the employment response found in state-level data. The impulse
response of unemployment is also highly consistent with what they found. The effect of a
shock to the unemployment rate falls to only 23 percent of the initial shock within four years
and is essentially equal to zero within ten years.
As the upper panel of Table 5 shows, the employment growth exhibits a significant
persistence at an annual frequency. This might seem at odds with the local technology
shock, which follows an AR(1) process. The reason behind this result is as follows. Suppose
that the technology shock can take two values: high and low. Consider an island with the
low shock and low employment. If the location is hit by the high shock, the job-finding rate
will increase as firms will create vacancies at a higher rate. At the same time, more workers
come from the rest of the economy. On the other hand, a shift in local employment at t can
be written as
∆Et = FtUt − λEt, (27)
where λ is the job separation rate, Ft is the average job-finding rate and Ut is the num-
ber of unemployed workers of the location at t. Given this equation, employment will
increase gradually until the location is hit by the low technology shock or the employment-
to-unemployment flow of the location balances with its unemployment-to-employment flow.
Therefore, the persistence of the job-finding rate, along with net mobility, generates sub-
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stantial persistence in the employment growth.
5.2 A bivariate process
In addition to the above univariate processes, Blanchard and Katz (1992) also consider
multivariate processes. More specifically, for each state they consider a log-linear system of
employment, the employment growth rate, and labor market participation. Since the model
developed in this paper does not include a labor market participation decision, results may
not be comparable. However, these authors report that estimating a bivariate system of
employment and the employment growth rate delivers nearly identical impulse responses for
employment and unemployment. Keeping this in mind, the following bivariate process is
considered:20 
∆et = c1,0 +
2∑
j=1
(c1,1,j∆et−j + c1,2,j e˜t−j) + ε1,t
e˜t = c2,0 +
2∑
j=1
(c2,1,j∆et−j+1 + c2,2,j e˜t−j) + ε2,t,
(28)
where ∆et is, as in the univariate case, the local log employment growth, and e˜t is the local
log employment rate minus the aggregate log employment rate: e˜t = log(Et/Lt)− log(1− r).
Given this system, the joint responses of the two variables are calculated while using the
following one-time shock considered by Blanchard and Katz (1992): (ε1,t, ε2,t) = (−1, 0).
Although the bivariate system considers the log employment growth and the log employment
rate, the results are presented using the responses of log employment and the unemployment
rate as in Blanchard and Katz (1992). The estimated joint impulse responses are plotted in
the upper panel of Figure 3. The figure shows that in the first year, a decrease in employment
of 1 percent is associated with an increase in the unemployment rate of 0.47 percentage
point. The effect on the unemployment rate steadily decreases over time and disappears
after five to six years. Over time, the effect on employment builds up, to reach a peak of
-1.57 percent after three years and a plateau of about -1.05 percent. These joint impulse
20This system is identical to the trivariate system on page 32 of Blanchard and Katz (1992), except it
excludes the participation rate.
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responses in simulated data are remarkably consistent with those obtained by Blanchard and
Katz (1992) from state-level data. (See Figure 7 of their paper.)
As stated earlier, the purpose of this impulse response analysis is to summarize the time
series patterns of local employment and unemployment in the model economy. Therefore,
the above results should not necessarily suggest that this paper reaches the same conclusions
as those in Blanchard and Katz (1992). For example, the local technology shock in the model
follows an AR(1) process, and therefore, local employment should exhibit mean reversion,
at least in the long run. However, Figure 3 shows that, in the model, an employment
shock seems to affect local employment permanently. The reason for this counterintuitive
prediction is that the assumptions of the employment shock are different between Blanchard
and Katz (1992) and the current model.
These authors assume that local demand shocks are one-time random-walk shifts21 and
these shifts in employment have an immediate impact on unemployment, but not vice versa.22
Therefore, the permanent drop in employment in Figure 3 is the impact of imposing these
highly restrictive assumptions on the simulated data.
6 Role of location-specific productivity
In Section 3, it was argued that (i) a sufficient dispersion in location-specific productivity
is important for the negative correlation of local employment and unemployment and (ii)
the volatility of the local unemployment rate decreases with the productivity dispersion. To
illustrate these points numerically and to provide further intuition for the role of location-
specific productivity, the model is solved for different values of the volatility of location-
specific productivity, ω, while adjusting the moving cost to target gross mobility and keeping
the other parameters at their benchmark values. The experiment considers the following two
21In the Comments and Discussion section of Blanchard and Katz (1992), Robert Hall raises doubt about
the empirical basis of this implicit assumption.
22Although this assumption seems plausible in a frictionless or market-clearing economy, it is highly
restrictive when there are trading frictions. For example, as shown in equation (27), a shift in employment
is affected by unemployment. Moreover, given that the monthly job-finding rate is quite high (Table 4), it
is hard to expect current unemployment to have no impact on current employment, especially at an annual
frequency.
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values for ω: 0.05ωB and 1.5ωB, where ωB denotes the benchmark value of the parameter.
The last two columns of Table 4 summarize the key results of the experiment.23 They show
that net mobility, σm, and locational unemployment differences, CV
wf, are indeed inversely
related to the volatility of location-specific productivity, ω.
To further illustrate the impact of the productivity dispersion, I consider the annual
growth of local employment and unemployment. As in Section 5, let ∆et be the log local
employment growth at year t. Similarly, let ∆ut be the log local unemployment growth at
year t: ∆ut = log(Ut/Ut−1) where, as before, Ut is the number of local unemployed workers
at year t. Table 4 shows that the economy with the lower productivity dispersion generates
an unreasonably high volatility in the local employment growth: std(∆et) of the economy is
six times larger than what is in the state-level data. The volatility of the local unemployment
growth, std(∆ut), of the economy is also much higher than the volatility of the state-level
unemployment growth. On the contrary, in both the benchmark model and the economy with
the higher productivity dispersion, the volatility of the local unemployment and employment
growth is comparable to that measured from state-level data. More important, when there
is insufficient productivity dispersion, the model fails to account for the negative correlation
between local employment and unemployment.
In addition to these moments, one can also consider the above bivariate process for these
two economies. The lower panels of Figure 3 summarize the associated impulse responses.
The results show that the positive response of unemployment to the negative employment
shock is slightly stronger in the economy with the higher dispersion (i.e., when ω = 1.5ωB).
However, in the economy with the lower productivity dispersion (i.e., when ω = 0.05ωB),
a decrease in local employment is reflected in an immediate decrease in the unemployment
rate and an even larger drop in local unemployment, in percentage terms. So, when there is
insufficient dispersion in location-specific productivity, the model also cannot replicate the
key features of the data documented by Blanchard and Katz (1992).
23The moving costs in the economies with the productivity dispersion 0.05ωB and 1.5ωB are, respectively,
2.920 and 6.877.
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7 Implications for the cyclicality of mobility
In Section 3, it was shown that both the probability that an unemployed worker moves
each period and the probability that a stayer finds a job each period increase with aggre-
gate productivity. Depending on which of the two probabilities responds more to aggregate
productivity, overall mobility and aggregate unemployment are positively or negatively re-
lated. This section introduces a permanent aggregate productivity shock and explores the
relationship between aggregate unemployment and mobility. Specifically, the model is sim-
ulated while raising both the local technology shock of each island and the idiosyncratic
productivity shock of each match by 1 percent.24
Table 6 summarizes the responses of the key aggregate variables. It shows that the
permanent shock lowers aggregate unemployment while raising overall mobility, the average
wage and the total number of vacancies. These responses are quite consistent with both
the procyclicality of labor mobility in the U.S. shown in Figure 4, and Abraham and Katz
(1986), who argue that shifts in unemployment are primarily driven by aggregate shocks.
It should be stressed that the Lucas-Prescott model predicts counter-cyclical labor mo-
bility. Therefore, the above results suggest that within-market frictions might be essential in
understanding how unemployment and mobility are related and that ignoring such frictions
could lead to an important oversight regarding how the labor force reallocates across sectors
over the business cycle.
8 Conclusions
Motivated by large cross-state unemployment rate differences as well as a high degree of
inter-state labor mobility, this paper constructs an equilibrium model of labor mobility and
24Although it is straightforward to introduce a persistent aggregate shock into the model, its solution
imposes a heavy computational burden as both the law of motion Γ and the distribution Φ are no longer
time-invariant. On the other hand, Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007) argue that when the persistence of the
aggregate shock is high, the steady-state comparisons provide an adequate approximation for the elasticity
of the vacancy-unemployment ratio to aggregate productivity. Since this ratio is key to generating the
negative correlation between unemployment and mobility, the impact of the above permanent shock can also
be interpreted as an approximate measure of the model’s response to a highly persistent aggregate shock.
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job search by merging two central frameworks of equilibrium unemployment: the island
model (e.g., Lucas and Prescott, 1974) and the search and matching model (e.g., Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994). The model is able to account for the main cross-sectional and time
series properties of local unemployment, including those documented by previous empirical
work (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992).
The model shows that idiosyncratic location-specific productivity is important not only
for gross labor flows but also for local labor market dynamics. Specifically, it plays a key role
in accounting for the negative correlation between local employment and unemployment.
Moreover, both the analytical and numerical results suggest that neglecting equilibrium
effects induced by trading frictions between workers and firms could lead to a conclusion that
unemployment and mobility are positively related, although their true relation could well
be negative. For example, in the Lucas-Prescott model, mobility and unemployment move
together. In contrast, the model developed in this paper generates a negative correlation
between these two variables. This is consistent with the procyclicality of regional mobility
as documented in this paper.
Although this paper deals with locational unemployment and geographic mobility, its
results have important implications for labor mobility across occupations and industries.
Recent work by Moscarini and Thomsson (2007), Moscarini and Vella (2008) and Kambourov
and Manovskii (2009) shows that occupational and industrial mobility are also procyclical.
These empirical findings in the literature, along with the above results, raise the possibility
that labor market dynamics of the sort modeled in this paper may also be relevant to
occupational and industrial mobility.
With appropriate extensions, the model developed in this paper could also shed light
on other questions of policy relevance. Given micro-data for other countries, such as those
in the European Union, the model could be calibrated to Europe. The model could then
be used to evaluate the extent to which lower labor mobility in Europe contributes to its
higher unemployment rate. The model could also be used to examine whether the costs of
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switching sectors or training costs have a substantial impact on unemployment.
It should be noted that the model does not allow for the possibility that workers can move
across local markets without going through an unemployment spell. Thus, an interesting,
but both empirically and computationally harder exercise would allow for job-to-job flows
across markets and examine whether they amplify the effects of local disturbances on local
employment and unemployment. This type of an extension would also help in the under-
standing of the individual-level relationship between employment and wages in a multi-sector
setting and therefore allow for a welfare evaluation of competing policies that tie benefits
and moving costs to individuals’ earnings.
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cyclical unemployment of the U.S. 0.245
cross-country unemployment of Europe 0.403
(0.039)
cross-country unemployment of Europe, 0.355
excluding Spain and Switzerland (0.021)
controlling for size and fixed effects of states
CVw across states (weighted) 0.204
(0.033)
CVwf across states (weighted and fixed effects free) 0.148
(0.034)
Notes: Cross-state unemployment differences and aggregate unemployment were measured
using the BLS’s monthly state unemployment and labor force series of Jan. 1976 - May 2011.
European annual unemployment data of 2003-2010 were obtained from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (http://stats.oecd.org) and include the follow-
ing 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and United Kingdom. Over the sample period, the average unemployment rate of these 18
European countries is 6.7 percent.
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Table 2: Labor Mobility
variable data description
gross mobility, mt 0.028 the number of workers who change their state of
(0.006) residence between years t− 1 and t relative to the
U.S. labor force at year t
in-migration, mini,t 0.029 the number of workers who in-migrate to state i
(0.025) between years t− 1 and t relative to the state’s
labor force at year t
out-migration, mouti,t 0.029 the number of workers who out-migrate from state i
(0.016) between years t− 1 and t relative to the state’s
labor force at year t
net mobility, σm 0.011 the standard deviation of the net-migration rate,
std(mini,t −mouti,t ), of an average state over time
Notes: The table is constructed using the Integrated Public Use Micro Sample of the CPS of
1982-1984, 1986-1994, and 1996-2010 (King et al., 2010). The sample includes adult civilians
age 20-64 years who are in the labor force, but it excludes movers from foreign countries.
The standard deviations are in parenthesis. See Section 2 for details.
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Table 3: Parameters of the Benchmark Model
parameter value description
β 0.999 the time discount factor
λ 0.0083 the job separation rate
η 0.407 the parameter of the matching technology
γ 0.052 a worker’s bargaining power
b 0.921 flow utility of unemployment
φ 0.015 the parameter of the local technology
ψ 0.697 persistence of the idiosyncratic shock
[k1−ω; k1+ω] [0.794; 1.222] the vacancy creation cost
ω 0.036 volatility of the idiosyncratic shock
C 4.911 the moving cost
σ 0.0047 the conditional std.dev. of the local technology shock
ρ 0.988 persistence of the local technology shock
Notes: The value of the weekly discount factor β is consistent with an annual interest rate
of 5 percent, i.e., 0.999 ' 1/1.051/48. The values of λ, η, γ, b, φ and ψ are set by using prior
studies on aggregate unemployment and labor income. The value of k1+ω is determined by
equation (8). The values of the remaining five parameters, k1−ω, ω, C, σ and ρ, are chosen
by targeting the data moments listed in the upper panel of Table 4.
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Table 4: Main Results
moment data benchmark low ω high ω
calibration targets
aggregate unemployment, r 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.056
gross mobility, m 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
net mobility, σm 0.011 0.011 0.070 0.010
volatility of per-worker output, σy 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
persistence of per-worker output 0.655 0.656 0.644 0.653
predictions
unemp.rate differences, CVwf 0.148 0.156 0.168 0.152
persistence of unemp. rate 0.994 0.989 0.961 0.988
overall market tightness 0.539-0.634 0.616 0.661 0.627
monthly job-finding rate 0.388-0.773 0.463 0.476 0.464
volatility of emp. growth, std(∆et) 0.012 0.014 0.066 0.013
volatility of unemp. growth, std(∆ut) 0.096 0.114 0.180 0.111
corr(∆ut,∆et) −0.279(a) −0.676(a) 0.077(b) −0.719(a)
Notes: Per-worker output refers to the ratio of total output produced in the local market
over a given year to its annual employment. Overall market tightness is defined as the
ratio of the total number of vacancies in the economy to aggregate unemployment. In the
model, annual employment and unemployment growth is defined as ∆et = log(Et/Et−1)
and ∆ut = log(Ut/Ut−1), where Et and Ut denote local employment and unemployment
at year t, respectively. However, in the data, the aggregate effects are controlled for by
considering the following differences: ∆ei,t = log(Ei,t/Ei,t−1) − log(EUSt /EUSt−1) and ∆ui,t =
log(Ui,t/Ui,t−1)− log(UUSt /UUSt−1), where Ei,t and Ui,t denote employment and unemployment
of state i at year t, while EUSt and U
US
t denote aggregate employment and unemployment
at time t. (If the aggregate effect is not controlled for, corr(∆ut,∆et) is even stronger at
−0.701.) Superscripts (a) and (b) denote the correlation coefficients of the significance levels
of 0.01 and 0.05, respectively.
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Table 5: Univariate Autoregressive Processes of Employment and Unemployment
log employment unemployment
growth, ∆e rate, r
regression results
one lag 0.444 0.832
(0.031) (0.042)






root mse 0.013 0.006
implied impulse responses
year 1 1.000 1.000
year 2 1.444 0.832
year 3 1.471 0.481
year 4 1.374 0.225
year 5 1.304 0.086
year 10 1.306 -0.002
year 20 1.304 0.000
Notes: This table estimates univariate models of the employment growth and the unemploy-
ment rate using simulated data and traces the implied impulse responses. The specifications
of the univariate models are those used by Blanchard and Katz (1992) to analyze state-
level data. The upper panel displays the coefficients of lagged dependent variables (the log
employment growth and the unemployment rate) and the root mean squared errors of the
regressions. The standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses. The lower panel shows
the implied impulse responses of log employment and the unemployment rate to innovation
of 1. It can be seen that both the coefficients and the impulse responses are remarkably
consistent with those in Table 1 of Blanchard and Katz (1992).
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Table 6: Impact of an Aggregate Productivity Shock
the aggregate unemployment rate, r -7.7%
the mobility rate, m +51.3%
the average wage, w +1.1%
the total number of vacancies, v +10.0%
Notes: The table summarizes the impact of a permanent increase in aggregate productivity
on the key aggregate variables of the benchmark model. It shows that an increase in aggregate
productivity lowers unemployment and raises labor mobility, which is consistent with the
observed procyclicality of gross mobility shown in Figure 4.
36
Figure 1: Mobility Decision
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Notes: The figure shows who moves and who stays behind. S(x) is the value to a worker
of searching for a job on the current island when his or her location-specific productivity
for that island is x. M is the value of leaving the island to look for a better job elsewhere.
Unemployed workers with location-specific productivity less than xc leave their current island
and those whose productivity level is equal to or higher than xc stay.
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Figure 2: Impact of a Local Technology Shock
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Notes: This figure shows the impact of an unanticipated adverse technology shock to an
island. S(x) and S ′(x) denote the values before and after the realization of the shock, re-
spectively. If there is insufficient dispersion (ω) in location-specific productivity and if the
adverse local technology shock is large, it is possible that S ′(x) < M for all x. This means
that if the dispersion ω is low, an adverse technology shock can reduce local unemploy-
ment while generating a counterfactual positive correlation between local employment and
unemployment.
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Panel A. Benchmark model
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Panel B. Economy with a low productivity dispersion
Year






Panel C. Economy with a high productivity dispersion
Year
Notes: This figure traces the joint responses of the local unemployment rate (solid curve)
and local employment (dashed curve) of the model economy to an adverse employment shock
considered by Blanchard and Katz (1992). See Section 5 for further details.
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Figure 4: Aggregate Unemployment and Labor Mobility


























































Notes: The upper panel plots aggregate unemployment and gross inter-state mobility in
the U.S. over the period 1980 through 2009 (the CPS does not record inter-state mobility
for the years 1985 and 1995). The lower panel plots the deviations of these two series from
their respective linear trends. Over the sample period, the correlation coefficient between
the two detrended series is -0.58 at the 0.01 significance level.
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A Data appendix
This appendix provides further empirical details. It starts by showing that an inter-state
move is more likely to be made for work-related reasons.
A.1 Reasons for moving in the CPS
The CPS records the reasons for moving for those who moved during the past year. The
question offers 17 response categories, ordered under four main groupings: family, employ-
ment, housing, and other reasons. Table A.1 summarizes responses to this question. It
shows that among inter-state movers, the highest percentage of people say that they move
for employment-related reasons followed by family- and housing-related reasons. For white
male workers, the percentage of employment-related reasons is even higher. Moreover, since
inter-state moves are frequently accompanied by a change in employment status or a new
employment relation, it seems reasonable to think that, to a certain extent, moves that are
reported as unrelated to employment are also influenced by economic factors.
Clearly, some of the residential moves are recorded as an inter-state move. For example,
an individual could be moving from Jersey City, NJ to New York, NY for family-related
reasons without actually changing his or her labor market. Thus, reasons for moving between
neighboring states may differ from reasons for moving between labor markets. One way to
reduce the effects of neighboring states is to consider longer distance moves. Table A.1
shows that the relative frequency of employment-related moves increases with the moving
distance and thus confirms that most of the moves between different local markets are made
i
Table A.1: Distribution of Movers by Reason for Moving, 1999-2009
between states between census
divisions
reason for moving all white all white
male male
employment 45.3% 51.6% 53.8% 59.2%
family 23.5% 20.2% 22.2% 19.0%
housing 20.2% 18.3% 11.3% 10.5%
other 11.0% 9.9% 12.7% 11.3%
Notes: The percent distribution of movers of the same group and the same type of moves
is presented by a column in the table. Reasons labeled “other” include attending or leaving
college, change of climate and health. The main sample includes adult civilians ages 20-64
who work for wages or salary. (When the sample is restricted to workers who are between 28
and 60 years of age, the frequency of employment-related reasons is even higher than those
in the table.)
for employment reasons.
A.2 More on cross-state unemployment differences
This appendix provides further facts on cross-state unemployment differences. It shows that
the differences remain large under various specifications.
A.2.1 Persistence
Here I quantify the effect of transitory shocks on local unemployment differences. For this




i (1− ρr) + ρrrRi,t + ε˜i,t+1, (A.1)
where ρr is the monthly autocorrelation of the relative unemployment rate, r
R
i is the state
fixed effect, and ε˜i,t is an i.i.d transitory innovation with zero mean and variance σ
2
r . Then,
the stationarity of the relative unemployment rate Blanchard and Katz (1992) implies that
CV2 = ρ2rCV
2 + σ2r . (A.2)
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Between Jan. 1976 and May 2011, monthly autocorrelation of the relative state unem-
ployment rate averages 0.9938 with a standard deviation of 0.0057. A weighted average
of these autocorrelation coefficients using the labor share of each state as the weight gives
ρr = 0.9940.
25 This value, along with equation (A.2), implies that approximately 98.8
percent (= 0.9942 × 100%) of the variance CV2 is attributable to the persistence of local
unemployment (even after controlling for state fixed effects), while the remaining 1.2 percent
is due to monthly transitory effects.
A.2.2 Differences by proximity
It is possible that unemployment differences between neighboring states are much smaller
than differences between distant states. To examine whether this is the case, the effect of
the proximity of local labor markets is measured using unemployment differences between
larger sub-national geographic units: census regions and census divisions. In particular, the
proportion of cross-state unemployment differences attributable to differences within these
larger geographic groups is calculated using the following decomposition:
CV2 = BG + WG, (A.3)
where BG denotes between-group differences and WG within-group differences. Over the
sample period, on average, only 17 percent of the total cross-state variance CV2 is due to
differences between the census regions, and the remaining 83 percent is due to differences
between states that belong to the same census region. For census divisions, as expected, the
proportion of within-group differences is a little lower and averages 55 percent. So, within-
group differences dominate between-group differences in both cases. These findings suggest
that cross-sectional unemployment differences are substantial even between proximate states.
25This suggests that local unemployment differences are as persistent as aggregate unemployment. Using
a quarterly autocorrelation of aggregate unemployment of 0.87 reported by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008),
monthly autocorrelation of aggregate unemployment is 0.955 (= 0.871/3).
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A.2.3 Differences by age
As shown in Table A.2, young workers move more frequently than their older cohorts. There-
fore, it is possible that cross-state differences in unemployment between local labor markets
are smaller among the younger labor force, while unemployment differences are largely gen-
erated by less mobile prime-age and older workers. However, Table A.3 shows that the
cross-sectional variation of unemployment remains large even after controlling for age.
Table A.2: Mobility by Age and Education
age (yrs.) no-college college all
20-34 0.037 0.058 0.044
35-54 0.017 0.021 0.018
55-64 0.011 0.014 0.012
Notes: The table displays inter-state mobility by age and education using the CPS of
1981-2010. The sample includes adult civilians ages 20-64 who are in the labor force. The
education category ”College” includes individuals who have a college degree or above.





Notes: The numbers are calculated using state unemployment series by main age group.
These series were issued by the BLS for 1978-2004 and are now discontinued. The data were
provided by Robert Shimer. See Shimer (2001) for a further description of these series.
One could also look at cross-state differences by education. However, to my knowledge,
there are no reliable data on unemployment by education at the local level. Nevertheless,
using the facts that overall unemployment is high among less educated workers and that
unemployment differences remain large among young workers (see Table A.3), it can be
seen that locational unemployment differences among less educated young workers are high,
despite their high mobility shown in Table A.2.
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A.3 Unemployment differences between movers and stayers
This section examines how unemployment and mobility are related at the individual level.
Specifically, it measures how unemployment differs by annual mobility status using the CPS
of 1982-2010. To focus on mobility that is not affected by schooling and retirement, the
sample is restricted to those who are between 28 and 60 years of age and in the civilian labor
force. In the sample, unemployment among movers and non-movers is 10.0 and 4.1 percent,
respectively. This means that recent movers are 2.5 times more likely to be unemployed than
the rest of the labor force.
Since both unemployment and mobility differ considerably across age and education of
the labor force, one might be concerned that the bulk of the unemployment gap between
movers and non-movers could be explained by age and education. To examine whether this
is the case, the following regression is considered for two main education levels, high school
and college:
hi,j,t = δDi + b˜Xi,j,t + ˜i,j,t (A.4)
where hi,s,t is a dummy for whether person i who is living in state j in year t is unemployed,
Di is a dummy for whether the person is a mover, and Xi,j,t is a set of controls such as state
and year effects, dummies for the person’s sex and race and a quartic polynomial for the
person’s age. The results displayed in Table A.4 show that among observationally identical
workers, movers are still more likely to be unemployed than non-movers.
These results are consistent with the assumption that movers are unemployed. In fact, in
the heterogeneous agent model, unemployment among workers who arrived at their current
location within the last 48 weeks is 18.9 percent, while unemployment among stayers is 5.3
percent. Thus, in the model, movers are 3.6 (=18.9/5.3) times more likely to be unemployed
than stayers, as opposed to 2.3 (=1+7.2/5.6) to 2.7 (=1+4.4/2.6) times as likely in the data.
Clearly, if on-the-job search is allowed, the model can generate lower unemployment
among movers. One can also introduce heterogeneity along the lines of ex-ante unobserved
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Table A.4: Unemployment by Mobility Status (%)
high school college
unemployment among movers 12.8 6.6
unemployment among stayers 5.6 2.6
difference, δ 7.183 4.345
(0.287) (0.223)
Notes: The employment and mobility statuses are measured from the CPS of 1982-2010.
The unemployment rates and their differences are reported in percentages. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. The labels high school and college denote, respectively, high school
diploma and a bachelor’s degree. δ measures unemployment of movers relative to that of
stayers while controlling for individuals’ observed characteristics as well as year and state
effects by using equation (A.4). The standard errors are in parenthesis.
ability, moving cost and the leisure value to target differences between movers and stayers.
In practice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the reliable data required to quantify
the relative effect of these elements.
On the other hand, the smaller mover-stayer unemployment gap in the data can be
partially attributed to inconsistency between the time at which workers move and the time
at which their unemployment and mobility statuses are recorded in the data. Specifically,
the CPS records an individual’s mobility status in March. However, it is well known that
geographic mobility peaks in the summer. Therefore, many unemployed workers who move
in the summer will already have found a job by the following March, suggesting that the
actual unemployment gap between movers and stayers could be higher than what is measured
in Table A.4. Nevertheless, the large unemployment gap between movers and stayers in the
model is comparable with that in the data.
A.4 Local productivity
Annual per-worker productivity by state for 1974 through 2004 was obtained from Bauer and
Lee (2005), who construct these series using data on gross domestic product by state released
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by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).26 Local productivity is defined as the logarithm
of per-worker gross state product minus the logarithm of per-worker gross domestic product
of the entire U.S. In the data, there is a substantial variation in the relative growth rates of
productivity across states. Specifically, during the sample period, the productivity of some
states has steadily grown at 0.8 percent per year relative to the national average, while the
productivity of some states has declined, with rates of -0.8 percent relative to the national
average. Since relative unemployment exhibits no trend (Blanchard and Katz, 1992), the
relative productivity is de-trended using state-specific linear trends. Then, for each state,
the standard deviation and annual autocorrelation of these de-trended shifts are calculated.
The weighted average of these standard deviations using the labor share of each state as the
weight is 0.028, while the weighted average of state-specific annual autocorrelation is 0.657.
According to Ciccone and Hall (1996), some states in which natural resources are sufficiently
important for their economic activity, gross state product per worker gives extremely volatile
output measures. When Alaska, Louisiana, West Virginia and Wyoming are excluded, as in
Ciccone and Hall (1996), the volatility and persistence measures become 0.027 and 0.655,
respectively.
For comparison purposes, I also look at the cyclical variation of per-worker gross domestic
product of the entire U.S. The standard deviation of the cyclical component of per-worker
product of the U.S. is 0.024, and its annual autocorrelation is 0.756. (The latter implies a
quarterly autocorrelation of 0.933.) These numbers are very close to those measured from
hourly productivity (e.g., Shimer (2005) and Bils, Chang and Kim (2011)), and thus reassur-
ing that gross state product per worker provides a reasonable measure of labor productivity.
B Details of the homogeneous islands model
This appendix presents further details of the homogeneous islands model. Specifically, it
provides the derivation of the analytical results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
26The BEA’s estimation methodology of gross domestic product can be found at http://bea.doc.gov/
regional/gsp/help/.
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B.1 Stayers and firms
Let H(x) =
∫













Since W (x) + J(x) is independent of w and V (x) = 0, the solution to the maximization
problem in equation (6) satisfies
W (x)− S(x) = γ
1− γJ(x). (B.3)
Combining equations (B.2) and (B.3),





Inserting the latter into equation (2) for W (x)− S(x), one can obtain





The last equation establishes how the queue length q(x) and the value S(x) are related at
the equilibrium for each x. Inserting equations (1) and (B.5) into equation (2) for W (x) and
S(x), respectively, yields equation (8).
B.2 Prohibitive moving cost
Given H0 =
∫
H(x)dG(x), the value of leaving the current island is
M = b− C + βH0. (B.6)
If no one moves, the moving cost is so high that
M ≤ S(1− ω). (B.7)
Since max{S(x),M} = S(x), ∫ S(x)dG(x) = S(1). Then, it follows that H0 = ζ0+ζ21−ζ1 and
S(1− ω) = ζ0 − β−ζ11−ζ1 (ζ0 + ζ2) + ζ2x. Inserting the last two equations into equation (B.7), it
can be seen that there will be no mobility if C ≥ Cmax, where
Cmax = b+
β − ζ1
1− ζ1 (ζ0 + ζ2)− ζ2(1− ω)− ζ0. (B.8)
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B.3 Mover’s problem
If C < Cmax, there exists 1−ω < xc < 1+ω such that S(xc) = M . Then, using equations (10)
and (B.6),
H0 =
ζ2xc + ζ0 − b+ C
β − ζ1 . (B.9)
On the other hand,
H0 = ζ0 + ζ1H0 + ζ2
(








Taking the integration and combining the result with equation (B.9) yields a quadratic
equation for xc. Solving the equation while taking into account the effect of the moving cost
will yield equation (11).
B.4 Mobility and unemployment
Let h denote an individual’s employment status: h = 1 if unemployed and h = 0 if employed.
Let µ(h, x) denote the measure of individuals residing on an island at the moment following
the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. Since both newly unemployed and newly arrived
workers draw their productivity shocks from the same distribution, some of the newly arrived
workers will decide to leave their new location again. Therefore, the number of movers is
given by









































Solving the latter for m yields the equilibrium mobility rate in equation (13). Finally, using
the total number of movers and stayers, one can arrive at equation (14).
C Details of the heterogeneous islands model
This appendix provides the definition of the equilibrium of the heterogeneous islands model
as well as the numerical details. It also discusses some of the modeling choices.
C.1 Definition of the equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of a set of value functions, {H, S, W , M , V , J}, a mobility decision
function, Ω, wages w, the measures, {µ, m, v}, the queue length, q, a law of motion, Γ, and
an economy-wide distribution, Φ, such that
1. employed: given Γ, H and w, the value function W (x, s) solves equation (17);
2. stayer: given q, Γ, Φ, H and W , the value function S(x, s) solves equation (18);
3. mover: given H and Φ, the value function M solves equation (19);
4. unemployed: the decision rule Ω(x, s) and the value function H(x, s) are consistent
with S(x, s) and M ;
5. matched firm: given Γ and w, the value function J(x, s) solves equation (20);
6. unmatched firm: given Γ, J , and q, the value function V (x, s) solves equation (21);
7. free entry: V (x, s) < 0 if v(x, s) = 0, or V (x, s) = 0 if v(x, s) > 0;
8. bargaining: given S, W , J and V , w(x, s) solves equation (22);
9. consistency of q: q(x, s)v(x, s) = Ω(x, s)µ(0, x); and
10. consistency of Γ and Φ: equations (16), (23) and (24) hold.
C.2 Perceived law of motion
Solving for the equilibrium involves the following two interrelated tasks: (i) finding decisions
of workers and firms conditional on the local labor market condition s = (z, µ), the law
x
of motion Γ, and the stationary distribution of the islands Φ; and (ii) finding the law of
motion Γ, and the stationary distribution Φ, that are consistent with workers’ and firms’
behavior. The model is solved using the method of Krusell and Smith (1998), by extending
its application to a multi-sector search setting.
The assumption on Γ is that the next period’s employment is a function of the current
technology shock, employment and labor force. The function will be referred to as the
perceived law of motion. Given M , m and the perceived law of motion, the local labor
market equilibrium is solved. Using the equilibrium, the behavior of a measure one of
workers across a continuum of islands is simulated. Numerical iteration on the perceived law
of motion is performed until M and m become consistent with the stationary distribution
Φ.
The specification of the perceived law of motion for employment is given by
p′ = κ11 + κ12z + κ13p+ κ14`, (C.1)
where p = −φ ln E˜ and ` = lnL. Since firms and workers have to forecast employment in
the subsequent periods, they also need to forecast the future labor force. For this purpose,
it is assumed that the log-labor force evolves according to the following equation:
`′ = κ21 + κ22z + κ23`. (C.2)
Under the benchmark parameterization, the perceived law of motion is given by:
p′ = 0.00061− 0.00061z + 0.9039p− 0.0014` (C.3)
subject to
`′ = −0.00808 + 0.00806z + 0.99857`. (C.4)




(Yt−Y )2 , where Yt is the
simulated value of p (or `) at t, Y is the mean of Yt over time and Yˆt is the predicted value
of Yt using the perceived law of motion and the simulated values of t − 1. The model is
simulated for 50000 periods. The values for R2 associated with regression equations (C.3)
and (C.4) are, respectively, 0.99997 and 0.99998. So, the aggregate approximation method
xi
works well for the model in the sense that forecasting errors that result from omission of the
other moments of the measure µ are negligible.
Given equations (C.1) and (C.2), the local labor market equilibrium is obtained using
value function iteration. The stochastic process of z is approximated using a 3-point Markov
chain. The grid points and the transition matrix of the Markov chain are calculated using







σz is the standard deviation of z. The grids of ` are given by the following five equally-spaced
points: {0,±0.1,±0.2}.
Having many grid points along the idiosyncratic shock, x, is essential for solving the
model. If a sufficiently fine grid is not maintained along x, the size of the local labor force
and employment will evolve in a stepwise pattern due to heavier mass points inherited from
the coarser grid. The latter, in turn, will make it difficult to retrieve a meaningful law
of motion for p and `. On the other hand, the combination of the large state space and
the two infinite dimensional objects (Γ and Φ) makes it impossible to carry out the entire
computation with a large number of grid points for x. For this reason, two types of grid
points are used. First, the value functions and the decision rules are solved on a coarser
grid of 15 equispaced grid points for x. Then, the values associated with a finer grid of
121 equispaced points of x are calculated by applying three-dimensional linear interpolation
(along x, p and `) to the values associated with the coarser grid. Once the decision rules for
the finer grid are obtained, simulating the economy amounts to simple matrix manipulation.
C.3 Numerical algorithm
The key steps of the numerical algorithm are as follows:
1. Guess the mobility rate, mˆ
0
, and the value of moving, Mˆ0.
2. Guess the coefficients of equations (C.1) and (C.2). Let κˆ01 = {κˆ011, κˆ012, κˆ013, κˆ014} and
κˆ02 = {κˆ021, κˆ022, κˆ023} denote the values of the coefficients. A good initial guess may
27Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010) show that the method outperforms other commonly used discretiza-
tion methods for high persistence.
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come from the economy with no local technology shock, i.e., κˆ01 = {0, 0, 1, 0} and
κˆ02 = {0, 0, 1}.
3. Given κˆ01, κˆ
0
2 and Mˆ
0, solve for the equilibrium queue lengths and the mobility decision.
This step involves the following tasks:
(a) Given the coarser grid points along x, guess H†, S† and W †. (The values indexed
by † and ‡ denote the values on the coarser and finer grids, respectively.)
(b) Given the parametric law of motion, calculate the value of the matched firm, J ′,
as a function of wage, w′.
(c) Find w† and q† for each point of the coarser grid.
(d) Using w† and q†, obtain new values for H†, S†, and W †. Repeat steps (a) through
(d) until the values of two consecutive iterations are close enough for each function
and each grid point.
(e) By applying numerical interpolation to H†, S† and q†, generate the job-finding
rate f(q‡) and the mobility decision Ω‡ on the finer grid of x.
4. Using Ω‡, f(q‡), and mˆ
0
, simulate the economy for a large number of periods.
5. Estimate the coefficients of equations (C.1) and (C.2) using the simulated data. Let
the estimates be κˆ11 = {κˆ111, κˆ112, κˆ113, κˆ114} and κˆ12 = {κˆ121, κˆ122, κˆ123}. If κˆ0 = {κˆ01, κˆ02} and
κˆ1 = {κˆ11, κˆ12} are close enough, go to the next step; otherwise revise the coefficients by
setting κˆ0 = γ˜κˆ0 + (1− γ˜)κˆ1 for some 0 < γ˜ < 1 and go to Step 3.
6. Using the simulated data, calculate the mobility rate, mˆ
1
, and the value of leaving the
current island, Mˆ1. If mˆ
1
and Mˆ1, are close enough to mˆ
0
and Mˆ0, respectively, stop.
Otherwise, update the values of mˆ
0
and Mˆ0 and go to Step 2.
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C.4 Allowing for endogenous separation
If the local technology shock of an island declines abruptly, there can be firm-worker matches
whose x is too low to stay on the island. These are likely to be the matches formed at lower
location-specific productivity levels when the island had a high z. Let Ξ denote the total
value of the current match. Using equations (17) and (20), the total value is given by
Ξ(x, s) = y(x, z, E˜) + β(1− λ)E[Ξ(x, s′)|s] + βλE[H(x′, s′)|x, s]. (C.5)
Since the value of a separated firm is zero, it is efficient to separate matches whenever the total
match surplus Ξ(x, s) −M becomes negative. However, given the calibration in Section 4,
Ξ(x, s) > M for all realized values of (x, s) and, thus, there is no endogenous separation.
This is not to say that endogenous separation is irrelevant to local labor market dynamics.
Instead, it means that there is no inefficient match in the model economy. The main reason
behind this result is that the flow value of the dynamic equation (C.5), y(x, z, E˜) = xzE˜−φ,
remains well above the flow utility of a mover, b−C. Specifically, first, the stochastic process
for z is approximated by a finite-state Markov chain and the lowest value taken by xz is
much larger than b. Second, the values taken by E˜−φ are very close to 1, as indicated by
equations (C.3) and (C.4). Third, the moving cost, C, is approximately five times higher
than the flow output of a firm, y(x, z, E˜).
C.5 Random versus directed search across islands
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) argue that assuming random versus directed search across
markets is less important when the model period is short like the one considered in this pa-
per. Further, location-specific productivity shocks in the model make the difference between
random and directed search even less important because workers in the model take into
account not only the local labor market condition s = (z, µ) but also their location-specific
productivity x. In other words, workers may prefer to move to islands where they have high
x, even though local labor market conditions on the new island are worse than those in the
initial location. For this type of move, assuming random versus directed search across labor
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markets is inconsequential. Therefore, the main difference caused by random versus directed
search across markets is the number of repeat moves. Since, in the calibration, individuals’
lifetime utility varies more along location-specific productivity x than labor market condition
s, repeat mobility is negligibly small compared with unemployment. Moreover, unemploy-
ment duration is much longer than the model period. Therefore, the number of repeat moves
in the model is too small to have any significant impact on the simulated moments.
Even if repeat mobility were large, there are various ways to embed the model with
random mobility into a setting with directed mobility. One simple way is to count a repeat
mover as a resident of his or her initial location until he or she settles in a particular labor
market. Therefore, as long as repeat mobility is not directly targeted, assuming random
versus directed search across islands is less important in the current model. For theoretical
properties of models with random search, see Alvarez and Veracierto (2000).
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